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THE COMMON LAW AND THE EVIDENCE CODE:
ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?
Neil Brooks*
The only direction I was given in preparing for this panel was
that the title of the session would be "The Proposed Federal
Evidence Code." This gave me the freedom to pull from my files any
one of a number of speeches that I have given in the past three or
four years in which I have spoken in laudatory and glowing terms
about how the Code reconciles the various interests of our
procedural system and how it places the rules of evidence on a sound
empirical basis. I have chosen instead, to speak about an aspect of
the Code of which I have less confidence, but which at the end of the
day might be the most far-reaching. This aspect relates to the issue
of the nature and methodology of a Code; in particular, the
methodology of the Evidence "Code". This topic is of more general
interest than other aspects of the Code, and it raises significant
questions about the relationship between the civil and the common
law that will eventually have to be confronted in all areas of the law.
That Law Reform Commission of Canada is specifically required to
address itself to this issue. The Commissioner's statutory objects
include the study of, "the reflection in and by the law of the distinctive concepts and institutions of the common law and civil law legal
systems in Canada, and the reconciliation of differences and discrepancies in the expression and application of the law arising out of
differences in those concepts and institutions." I A recurrent
criticism of the Evidence Code in the common law regions of Canada
has been that it is a "Code". Even those who would agree that the
laws of evidence are in need of drastic reform resisted the notion that
they ought to be codified. The concern accounting for this
resistance, if not expressed, was always apparent: a Code is a civilian
concept and, therefore, foreign to the common law, and could not, as
lawyers were fond of analogizing, be grafted onto it. This argument
was often taken to be so self evident that simply labelling the Code
civilian was intended to end debate about its merits. Representative
of the comments was one made by the Ontario Criminal Lawyer's
Association ".... it would be far better to adapt our existing Statutes
so as to improve them, rather than experimenting with a concept (a
Code) foreign to our common law heritage." ' Unfortunately,
*
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because many common law lawyers use the word "civilian" as simply
an emotive and pejorative term, referring generally to legal cultures
dominated by an inquisitorial system in which the rights of the
accused are jeopardized, or an all-embracing Code under which the
law is rigid and unanalytical, it is difficult to extract from these
criticisms a specific proposition that can be verified or refuted. My
argument in this paper will, therefore, be general. I will argue that
the concept or methodology of a Code of Evidence is not alien to the
common law. While my arguments will be addressed to this question
in particular, they relate to an even more general proposition: There
is no reason why the same legislative enactment cannot be enacted in
common law Canada and civil law Canada and be consistent, or at
least not inimical to, the judicial methodologies of both systems.
Although this issue would appear to raise the notoriously difficult question of the differences between the common and civil law,
this is a debate which I hope to avoid. I would not want my argument
to be viewed as yet another attempt to inflict the corrupting effect of
the common law upon Quebec Civil Law. 3 The issue can to some
extent be fairly skirted because whatever the essential differences
between the common and the civil law, the existence or nonexistence
of a Code is a minor one. 4 Although it might seem peculiar to
speak of a common law system if all the law in that system were
codified, nevertheless, it would still be necessary to distinguish, for
example, the English legal system, even if codified, from the French
system. Civil law and codified law are not synonymous terms. France
and Germany were described as civil law countries before codification took place, and today, Scotland and South Africa are properly
referred to as civilian in some sense and they do not have Codes. 1
3

4

5

See Baudouin, The Impact ofthe Common Law on the Civilian System ofLouisiana and Quebec, in J. Dainow (ed.), The Role of JudicialDecisions and Doctrine
in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions1 (1973).
For a thorough examination of the difference see A.A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence109-141 (1971); see also Sawer, The Western Conception of
Law, in 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 1-26 (1975); but see
A.T. Von Mehren, The Civil Law System: Cases and Materialsfor the Comparative Study ofLaw 3 (1957). Some comparativists argue that while it is not the fact
of a Code alone that distinguishes the common law system from the civilian
system, what does distinguish them is the underlying ideology of codification.
And that this ideology is not abridged simply by the adoption of a Code in a common law jurisdiction:
An entirely different set of ideas and assumptions is associated with the
California Civil Code, or with the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in
any American jurisdiction. Even though such codes may look very much like
a French or German Code, they are not based on the same ideology, and
they do not express anything like the same cultural reality.
J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 33 (1969).
R.B. Schlesinger, ComparativeLaw: Cases - Text - Materials234-5 (30 ed. 1970).
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Codification: A Definition
In spite of the intensity and passion with which many common
law lawyers inveigh against the notion of codification, there is
surprisingly little common ground about what a Code is, and how it
differs from a statute or other form of legislative enactment. Codificatidn, in its broadest sense, simply describes the reduction of the
law to a written form. It is in this sense that common law lawyers
often use the term. When Parliament passes a statute dealing with
an area of law that was previously left entirely to decisional law,
lawyers are apt to say that the law has been codified. Thus, the
concept of codifying the law of Evidence has been criticized by some
by comparing it to the "codified" rules regulating drunken driving
and the problems of interpretations that have arisen under that
legislation. Used in this sense codification is not any different than
any other form of legislative enactment. However, as a matter of
convenience in usage, codification ought to be distinguished from
both a revision of statutory law (which is an exercise undertaken
periodically by the Federal and Provincial governments in an effort
to rationalize present statutory law by renumbering it and occasionally pruning out obsolete sections) and also a consolidation (which is
an exercise of bringing together into one legislative enactment a
number of legislative enactments that deal with the same subject
area). The more difficult task, of course, is identifying the characteristics which distinguish a Code from any other statutory enactment
dealing with a specific area of law. When does an Evidence Act or a
Criminal Act become an Evidence Code or Criminal Code?
Most commentators agree that in modern usage "Code"
describes a legislative enactment that is comprehensive, systematic,
pre-emptive and stated in terms of principles.' Professor Hawkland has briefly described the first three of these attributes:
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See Donald, Codification in Common Law Systems, 47 Aust. L.J. 160 (1973);
Scarman, Codification and Judge-Made Law: A Problem of Coexistence, 42
Indiana L.J. 355, (1966-67); Lobingier, Codification, in 2 Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences 606, (1930); Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codification 2 Inter-American Law Review 1 (1960); Bayitch, Codification in Modern
Times, in A.N. Yiannopoulos (ed.), CivilLaw in theModern World (1965); Goodrich, Restatement and Codification, in Reppy (ed.), David Dudley Field-Centenary Essays 241 (1949); R.B. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases - Text Materials 235 (3d ed. 1970). Some of the best writing on the concept of codification in the common law is contained in the literature about the Uniform Commercial Code, see for example, Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70
Yale L.J. 1037 (1961); Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 Stanford L. Rev. 621 (1975); Fanswaorth, A General Survery ofA rticle 3 and an Examination of Two Aspects of Codification, 44 Tex. L.
Rev. 644 (1966); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Methodology, [1962) U.
Ill. L.F. 291.
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"A 'code' is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a
whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its
subject area save only that which the code excepts. It is systematic in that
all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent
terminology, form an interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan
and containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is
sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in
accordance with its own basic policies. (Footnotes omitted) 7

These attributes of a legislative enactment are to some extent
discrete: for example, a legislative enactment could be comprehensive but not pre-emptive of the common law or drafted in terms of
principles. Accordingly, because "Code" is a word that is used to
describe a legislative enactment that has a number of specific
characteristics and these attributes are to some extent discrete, to
ask whether the law of evidence, or any other area of law, ought to be
embodied in a Code, is not likely to be fruitful. The concept is too
general to be meaningfully debated. The prospect of an intelligent
joinder of issues would be enhanced by debating specific questions,
such as the following:
1. In the subject area should the legislative enactment
embrace most of the law, should it be comprehensive?
2. How should the statute be interpreted, in particular:
(1) Should the words used in the statute be given meaning
by reference to the purpose of the legislation rather
than the plain meaning of the words used?
(2) Should the prior common law be of no precedential
value in interpreting the statute?
3. Should the legislative enactment pre-empt the common
law, and unprovided for cases be resolved by reference to the principles and policies underlying the statute?
4. Should the statute be systematically arranged?
5. Should the statute be drafted in terms of general principles
rather than in terms of specific detailed rules?
If such questions were debated separately on their merits with
respect to a particular legislative enactment, it is less likely that the
common law lawyers would be distracted by vague instincts that the
concept of codification is inherently evil. Of course, if sufficient of
the above questions are answered in the affirmative, "code"
continues to be a useful word to describe the resultant legislative
enactment.
General Concerns About Codification
Before turning to the characteristics of the Evidence Code, and
7
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the question of whether these characteristics are consistent with
common law methodology, I would like to set aside a number of
arguments or concerns about codification that I will not be considering. Although they are matters which have crept into discussions
about the Evidence Code, I will not deal with them here in any detail
as I think they are in large measure too relevant to any serious
assessment of the merits of the Evidence Code. 8 Setting them out
here may help to further define my argument:
1. A Code, no matter how well drafted, cannot be self-executing. Its success depends ultimately upon the attitude of the courts.
In the past, common law judges have on occasion completely
mangled sensible statutory schemes by resorting to jibberish about
the plain meaning of words, maxims of statutory construction such
as "Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed," and by demonstrating generally a callous insensitivity to
the need to collaborate with the legislature in implementing contemporary social policy. Given these attitudes of the courts it has been
suggested that a Code, particularly one that requires the Courts to
apply principles and one that is pre-emptive of the common law, is
not feasible.
There is, alas, a complaint that cannot be taken lightly. The
undying allegiance to the policy judgments that underlie the seamless web of the common law that many judges appear to have and
their apparent inability to construe legislation to further legislative
purposes, must be a matter of concern to anyone who is concerned
with democratic law-making. On the other hand, to draft legislation
on the assumption that the Courts are not willing or able to fairly
discharge the tasks delegated to them is to yield to judicial blackmail.
The attitude of the Courts must be distinguished from their
institutional competence. Important institutional constraints do
impinge upon both the legislature and the courts in law-making.
These considerations were not, I hasten to add, ignored in the drafting of the Evidence Code.

8

For a general discussion of arguments for and against codification and citations
to the literature see generally Patterson, The Codification of CommercialLaw in
the Light of Jurisprudence,in New York Law Revision Commission, Report of
the Law Revision Commission for 1955; Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial
Code in the Light of ComparativeLaw, in New York Law Revision Commission,
Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1955; Speidel, Summers and White,
Teaching Materials on Commercial Transactions1-12 (1969); Stone, A Primer
on Codification29 Tulane Law Review 303 (1955); R. Pound, 3 Jurisprudencech.
19 (1959).
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2. One of the arguments frequently raised in the United States
during the protracted debate about codification in that country in
the nineteenth century was that the common law was not susceptible
to formulation in statutory form. Carter, the leading opponent of
codification, argued:
The fallacy (and it is a gross one), wrapped up in these plausible assertions
that whatever is known can be written, and that if a rule of law can be written by a judge in an opinion, it can be written and enacted in a Code,
consists in the false assumption that courts lay down rules absolutely,
whereas they lay them down provisionally only. 9

This argument is still made occasionally by common law lawyers. I
must confess, however, that I have never been able to give it any
meaningful content. Perhaps the argument is simply a variation of
the argument that the common law is flexible and can grown to take
account of new conditions, whereas a Code is always rigid and,
therefore, soon outdated. If that is what is meant by the assertion
"The common law of evidence cannot be expressed in statutory
form", it is an argument that I will deal with later. On the other
hand, perhaps what is meant by the remark is that the law of
evidence cannot be expressed in statutory form because it is whatever the judge says it is in a particular case. If so, I would agree with
the assertion but simply ask whether that is a very satisfactory state
of affairs.
3. A great deal of the literature on codification is devoted to
speculations about the motivations of the codifiers. It has been
suggested that there is a close historical relationship between codification and the evolution of more egalitarian societies. On the other
hand, it has been argued that history reveals that Codes are the tools
of despotic governments. 10 Some authors view Codes, historically,
as instruments of nationalization. " The Evidence Code was
motivated by more of these factors and, in spite of the occasional
(one assumes whimsical) allegation to the contrary, it is not an
integral part of a larger conspiracy to assimilate English speaking

9
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J. Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law 25-26 (1884).
... codification can be viewed as part of the whole historical movement
which gradually transformed societies whose structures had been based on
social heirarchy and inequality into societies based on democracy and
equality.
Maillet, The HistoricalSignificance of French Codification, 44 Tulane L. Rev.
681, 687 (1970)
Schlesinger, The Uniform CommercialCode in the Light of ComparativeLaw, 1
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 11, 17-22 (1959).
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Canada into Quebec. Like the codification movement in Quebec 12
the motivations for the Evidence Code were entirely practical. A
judgment was made that the goals of the procedural system could be
more nearly achieved by an Evidence Code.
4. The spirit of democracy is invoked both by those who support and those who oppose Codes. Civilians are fond of arguing that
a Code is more democratic than the common law in its preparation
and its implementation. Indeed, it has been argued that the legal
profession in common law countries has always opposed codification
because a Code is more democratic. In a review of two recent
biographies of Joseph Story, Morton J. Horwitz suggested that one of
the reasons that Roscoe Pound rejoiced in the defeat of the codification movement in the nineteenth century was that:
Codification was democratic law-making. The rule of the common law
maintained the separation between law and politics. The former conferred
the primary law-making powers on an untutored populace; the latter
enabled the legal profession to control the scope and form of legal
change. 13

5. An argument often put forward in support of codification,
which also has a clear ideological basis, is that a Code will make the
law more accessible and more readily intelligible to the average
citizen. This is perceived as being an important value because of the
direct relationship between legal demystification and democracy.
On the issue of simplification, the proponents of codification
have unfortunately often overstated their case. For example, Justian
declared:
We ordain that our formulation of the law, which with God's help we have
composed shall have the name of Digest or Pandects: No jurists of posterity
shall dare to add their commentaries to it or try their verbosity to confuse
the comprehensive clarity of the Code. 14

Napoleon said that his aim to have a Code so simple and convenient
in its arrangement that the French peasant, reading it in its single,
slim, pocket-book form by candlelight would be able to know his
legal rights.
The critics of the Evidence Code - assuming perhaps that the
drafters were inspired by Justin and Napoleon - were fond of
12

See Brierly, Quebec's CivilLaw Codification, 14 McGill LJ. 521 (1968); Crepeau,
Civil Code Revision in Quebec, 34 Louisiana L. Rev. 921, (1974); Stone, To
Codify or Not to Codify: Derivation of Louisiana Law, 9 A.B.A. International
and Corp. Bulletin 16 (1964-65).
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17 Am. Journal of Legal History 275 (1973); see also Tushmet, Perspectives on
the Development ofAmerican Law: A CriticalReview of Friedman's "A History
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of American Law, 81 Wisconsin L. Rev. 81, 106-109 (1977).
Quoted in Scarman. Codification and Judge-MadeLaw: A Problem of coexistence, 42 Indiana L.J. 355, 357 (1966-67).
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pointing out that such complete simplicity could not be obtained,
and therefore a "Code" was futile. Others even perceived (and
rejected) the ideological basis of the argument. One critic remarked
that the goal of simplicity "smacks of a longing for "people's courts"
where "justice" will be done with despatch and simplicity, without
formality and fancy verbiage. This has been achieved in a number of
countries behind the Iron Curtain." ' The proponents of the argument that because complete simplicity cannot be achieved and,
therefore, a Code should not be attempted, commit, of course, the
logical fallacy of bifurcation. The impossibility of drafting a Code of
Evidence that would permit a layperson upon reading it to become
an evidence scholar does not foreclose the possibility of drafting a
Code that is at least more accessible and easier to understand than
the present law of evidence. Some would say that much of value
would be achieved if the law of evidence could be made more
comprehensible even to lawyers.
6. As a final preliminary matter, I am concerned here with the
meaning of the word Code when used to refer to a single piece of
legislation. I am not using it in the sense of an all-embracing codification of the law such as the classic codes of the civil law world. Nor
do I wish to enter the larger debate of whether all the common law is
doomed to codification. 11
Characteristicsof a Code
In discussing the compatibility of the Evidence Code and the
common law, I will discuss only three characteristics of the Code: it
is comprehensive, pre-emptive of the common law and drafted in
terms of principles. It is these characteristics that are most frequently alleged to make it "foreign" to the common law and different in
kind from statutes traditionally enacted in common law jurisdictions. Indeed, much of the debate has centered on the fact that the
Code is drafted in terms of principles rather than specific detailed
rules.
1. Comprehensive
A statute is drafted against the background of a body of law,
much of which is to be preserved. Details of the law are to be
changed and only those details to be changed are enacted in statutory form. A Code, on the other hand, is designed to set out the

15 Written Comments Received From the Public Relating to The Laws of Evidence
26 (1976).
16 Many of the criticisms of codification relate only to some form of all-embracing
codification. See Hahlo, Codifying The Common Law: ProtractedGestation, 38

Mod. L. Rev. 23 (1975).
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whole law relating to a particular subject in a comprehensive manner. It is to form the basic source of legal rules in that field. This
does not necessarily mean that the Code contains all the detailed
rules governing the subject which it treats. Certainly the Code of
Evidence contemplates that some specific rules of evidence will arise
that are not specifically covered by the Code. Examples of rules that
might be found outside the Code are rules regarding burden of proof
or authentication that relate to a specific offence or document. As a
simple matter of convenience these rules of evidence are most
appropriately found in the statutes dealing with the particular
subject matter to which they relate.
The Code-is comprehensive, however, in the sense that all of the
basic rules of evidence are set out in the Code. Only detailed rules
that might form exceptions or illustrations of these general rules and
which relate to particular matters, will be found outside the Code in
other statutory instruments. The comprehensiveness of the Code is
apparent from its general sections. The Code states that except as
provided in the Code or any other Act: all relevant evidence is
admissible; '7 every person is competent and compellable to
testify;i 18no testimony is privileged;'" all hearsay evidence is admissible. 20
For a legislative enactment to be comprehensive, it must
identify an autonomous branch of the law. Some matters fall clearly
under the heading "evidence" because they deal with the admissibility of evidence and reflect procedural values. However, the classification of other matters such as burden of proof, various discovery
devices and judicial notice are more troublesome. At the end of the
day the decision of whether or not to include these peripheral
matters in the Code was made largely on the basis of convenience of
reference and historical precedent.
A comprehensive statement of the law has two important
advantages in the area of evidence: firstly, it renders the law more
accessible; secondly, it permits evidentiary problems to be placed in
the context of the whole of the law of evidence and thus to be
resolved in a manner that is consistent with the underlying principles
of this body of law.
A priorithere would seem to be little room for differences of
opinion with respect to the desirability of expressing the law relating
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Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence s. 4(1) (1975).
Ibid s. 54
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to a particular subject matter in written form and collecting it, as
much as possible, within the four corners of one document. It would
seem obvious that the law would then be easier to learn and easier to
find. It cannot be maintained seriously that one can find the answer
to a given problem of evidence more quickly by searching through
the digests and encyclopedias, ferreting out the cases, reading them,
analyzing them, and then abstracting their ratio than by simply
looking at a Code, finding the relevant section and interpreting it.
This is particularly so with respect to the rules of evidence since most
evidence rulings are made in the lower courts and even though they
may deal with important points of evidence they may never get
appealed because the case may be settled or for some other reason
not appealed. Thus on any particular issue there are likely to be a
series of cases, many duplicative, many irrelevant, many decided
without reference to other similar cases. Anyone who has had the
unfortunate experience of researching an evidence problem in any
depth knows what a frustrating and perplexing task it is.
Accessibility is an important value particularly with respect to
the rules of evidence because evidence problems frequently arise for
the first time during the course of a trial when the judge or lawyers
have little time to research the law before it is applied. Furthermore,
if the rules are accessible, experienced and inexperienced counsel in
that situation will be placed on a more equal basis. At present
experienced counsel are able to manipulate obscure cases in a very
intimidating fashion. In the face of such authority, the judge and
less experienced counsel are often reluctant to have the trial
adjourned so that they can retire to the library and seek out the relevant case law. A comprehensive statement of the law, such as a
Code, would enable problems to be tied down to a particular section.
The section could be referred to in court, and if necessary, its
meaning debated.
The existence of a readily available and authoritative statement
of the rules of evidence would also be extremely helpful in conducting the trial of cases in provincial courts, where often a library or
even an encyclopedia on evidence law is not available. A Code will
reduce the possibility of erroneous rulings, and thus, the number of
appeals, and will generally expedite the trial of such cases.
The rules of evidence must also be known to practitioners who
do not appear in court. A draftsman, for example, must often take
into account problems that might at some time result in litigation.
He must draft, therefore, with problems of proof in mind. With a
code, each lawyer will have a pamphlet of the rules.
The rules will remain accessible because the various provisions
of the Code can be easily annotated as they are interpreted by the
courts. Amendments can be made when needed and new sections
added. All sources of evidence law can thus remain readily available.
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The second advantage of a comprehensive statement of the law
is that it permits evidentiary problems to be placed within the context of the rules of evidence as a whole. For instance, if a document is
to be admitted into evidence, three evidentiary problems commonly
arise: First, if a document is being admitted as truth of the matters
asserted in it, the document must come within one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule. In a code, all of these exceptions and the conditions upon which they rest are set out. The relevant exception, if any,
can be quickly noted and the conditions of that exception reviewed.
Second, the document must be authenticated. The common law
developed numerous rules, or numerous methods, by which a document must be authenticated. That is to say, the common law
developed numerous rigid requirements of proof that have to be
followed to prove that a document is what it purports to be. Again,
in a code there would be a single rule dealing with authentication. If
particular methods of authentication were required in specific
instances, they would all be conveniently set out so that a quick
reference would inform counsel of the best way to authenticate a
particular document. Finally, before a document is admitted, the
proponent of the document must prove that it is an original or, if it is
not an original, that it comes within one of the exceptions to the best
evidence rule. This rule and the exceptions to it would be set out in
the Code. Counsel could quickly review the section to see what the
definition of best evidence is and what exception, if any, a non-original document might come within.
Under the present law, when an objection is made to the admission of a document the exact basis for the objection is not always
clear, and the above grounds for excluding the document often confused. Moreover, even after an exhaustive review of the problem and
a search through the sources, one is often left with a disquieting
feeling that there is an obscure rule of evidence or case that might be
dredged up to hold the evidence inadmissible.
Even apart from these practical advantages, a comprehensive
statement of evidence law was necessary once the decision was made
that the bias in the rules of evidence should be changed from a bias
in favour of exclusion to a bias in favour of admissibility. The underlying philosophy of the Evidence Code is that all relevant evidence is
admissible. The only way this change in emphasis could be achieved
was by stating this principle and then proceeding to articulate all,
and the only, exceptions to it. Finally, a comprehensive statement
was necessary in order to facilitate the adoption of an overall and
literally consistent conceptual framework so that the Code could be
pre-emptive of the common law.
2. Pre-emptive
Invariably gaps in a Code's comprehensiveness will be found.
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All factual patterns that might emerge cannot be anticipated. Thus
the Code must provide a methodology for resolving what have been
variously described as
"unprovided for," "doubtful," "hard" or
"unenvisaged" cases. 2' One solution would be to have the judge
return to common law principles to resolve unprovided for cases.
This methodology is commonly adopted in common law jurisdictions. All the commercial codes in the United States, for example,
have a common law saving clause. Generally a clause is adopted
such as:
In any case not provided for in this Code the rules of law and equity including the law merchant shall govern. 22

The Code or statute is regarded as being essentially supplementary
to the common law jurisprudence. When a controversy is not covered
directly by the statute, even though it might be within the general
subject area of the statute, no further reference is made to the
statute.
The alternative methodology for resolving unprovided-for cases
is to direct the judge to look to the underlying concepts and theories
of the Code and apply them in resolving the question. When the
judge confronts a gap or an unforeseen situation, his or her duty is to
find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the
policy of the codified law. The Code becomes the only source of law
in the subject area. It pre-empts all the previous law. This is, of
course, the methodology of statutory construction used in most civil
law jurisdictions and the methodology commonly ascribed to a
Code.

21
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Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case, 2 Recueil D Etudes Sur Les
Sources Du Droit En L "HonneurDe Francois Geny 503 (1935).
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N.I.L. para. 196, quoted in Gilmore, On StatutoryAbsolescence, 39 U. of Col. L.
Rev. 461, 466-467 (1967). Under the Uniform Commercial Code it is unclear
whether the courts should reason by analogy to the Code itself in resolving unprovided for cases or whether they should resort to the princples of the common
law. See Young, Review of G. Gilmore, Security Interests in PersonalProperty,
66 Colum. L. Rev. 1571, 1574-77 (1966); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial
"Code" Methodology, [19621 U. I11. L.F. 291 (1962); Franklin, On the Legal
Method of the Uniform CommercialCode, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 330 (1951).
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(The civilian)... looks at the articles of a Code not as mere rulings, but as
particular expressions of more general rules. Therefore, if no express
answer to a certain problem is found in the Code, it is not improper to conconsider various articles in order to induce from them a more general rule
and to apply this if it can give a solution. It has sometimes been said that
articles of a code are not only law, but sources of law. This is true, not only
in the sense that the courts may, by deduction, decide on the implications of
a certain article, but also in the sense that the courts may, if necessary, use
induction to discover the general rules implied in the provisions of a code
and then, reverting to deduction, develop the full potential of these rules in
the solution of the problem at hand.
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Under the Evidence Code this latter methodology is explicitly
adopted. The judge must resolve unprovided for cases by reference
to the principles embodied in the Code. Section 3 provides:
Matters of evidence not provided for in this Code shall be determined in
the light of reason and experience so as to secure the purpose of this
Code. 24

Thus, the judge must ask, in resolving unprovided-for cases: given
the reasons, the purposes, and the policies underlying the provisions
of the Code, how would the legislature have resolved this particular
problem? He or she looks to analogous problems and analogous
considerations that are covered or dealt with in the Code. The judge
does not ask: how would a common law judge have resolved this
problem if this statute did not exist?
If the law of evidence is a unified body of knowledge and is
comprised of rules that are designed to reconcile certain procedural

23 (Continued)
Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code, in B. Schwartz (ed.), The Code Napoleon
and the Common-Law World 19, 31 (1956).
It may be that the problem pressing for adjudication is not controlled by the
code article .... Nevertheless, the orthodoxies of civilian technique call for
the use of a code text by way of analogy to meet the problem of the unpro
provided case. This is a striking difference from the British tradition, where
we encounter theories that statutes should not be given effect in situations
that they actually control. The civilian, however, is accustomed to regard a
code text as having the same sort of projective value as the common law
regards the decisions of the judges as having. Thus, the statutory text enjoys
a vitality even greater than it was intended to have. The technique of the
civilian in solving the unprovided case, thus becomes a struggle over the projective value of code articles.
Franklin, The HistoricFunction of the American Law Institute: Restatement as
Transitional to Codification? 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1378-79 (1934).
See also Monow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method
Jbr State and Nation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 351 (1943); Tate, Civilian Methodology in
Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673, (1970); Von Mehren, The Judicial Process: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 197, 204 (1956); Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961). In England when the
English and Scottish Law Commissioners began working on the codification of
contract law, the issue of how unprovided for cases would be resolved lead to serious differences of opinion. See Chloros, Principle, Reason and Policy in the
Development of EuropeanLaw, 17 Int. and Comp. L.Q. 849, 863-4 (1960).
24 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, s.3 (1975). Unfortunately this section has a ring to it which is very close to that of a section in the
Russian Civil Code. Section 4 of the Soviet Civil Code provides:
In the absence of legislative enactments or decrees bearing upon the decision
of a case, the court shall decide the case guided by the general policies of the
workers and peasants government.
Cited in E.W. Patterson, Jurisprudence 286 [19531.
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principles, and is not simply a ragbag of multifarious rules decided
on an ad hoc basis, it seems self-evident that its interpretation and
application should be consistent with these underlying principles.
This can only be achieved if judges turn to the Code, rather than to
the common law, to extract premises for judicial reasoning in areas
where there is a gap in the Code. To draw upon the common law
would involve the risk that credence would be given to a principle
which the Code had explicitly or implicitly rejected in other areas.
Although the adoption of this methodology was clearly inspired by
the civil law tradition, it is not a methodology that should be foreign
to the mental processes of good common law lawyers, or in any way
inimical to the common law tradition.
The reasoning process involved in using the policies and principles embodied in the Code as a premise for judicial reasoning is not
much different from the reasoning process involved when a common
law judicial craftsperson uses precedent. The judge distills from a
precedent a principle and then uses it as a premise in reasoning
about the problem before him. Precedents are used in effect as
indications as to how the law has reconciled competing interests in
resolving the particular problem. The same kind of deductive
reasoning is involved in construing a Code. The only difference is
that the judge does not turn to cases to derive the legal principles
which will form the premises for judicial reasoning, he or she turns to
the Code. The judge tries to implement the legislative design of the
Code by extending the policies and the reasons underlying it. He or
she looks to analogous sections rather than analogous cases. 2S
Furthermore, common law courts frequently, or at least occasionally, do use principles embodied in a statute as a premise for
judicial reasoning and numerous commentators have argued that
this is a form of reasoning that they should engage in with more
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If it is correct that the grand style of appellate judging involves looking at
the situation before the court in terms of its type situation and arriving at a
conclusion as to what is the best policy, then if you look at the precise language of the statute and at the situation before you and the reason for the
language seems to be present in the situation, you can expand by analogy or,
if the reason is absent, limit the statutory language. This is a perfectly permissible reasoning by analogy with the statutes instead of with cases; the
same principle exactly. You can say to yourself, "This is the reason for the
rule which is enunciated here; the explicit language does not ccver the situation which has arisen; should I apply the policy? Are the situations sufficiently similar so that the reasons that make this a good policy in the situation
covered precisely by the language should carry over to the situation which is
not precisely covered by the language?"
S. Mentschikoff, Commercial Transactions 11 (1969).
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frequency. 2 Justice Traynor has collected an impressive number of
cases where the courts have argued by analogy from statutes.
Indeed, he found that in certain periods of history common law
judges agressively pursued the use of statutes as judicial premises in
the development of the common law. He observed: 27
... the chatty year books were replete with creative lawmaking in the
courts on the basis of statutes. Judges used the eyes at the back of their
heads to note statutory rules as a source for analogous decisions.

Other commentators have discerned a recent trend in relying on
statutes as a basis for analogical reasoning.28
Drafted in Terms of Principles
A characteristic commonly ascribed to a Code is that it is
drafted in general terms, in principles, that must be referred to in
resolving particular cases. A statute, by comparison, is drafted in
terms of detailed rules; an effort is made to foresee and specifically
cover every possible factual circumstance.29 The Evidence Code, by
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Landis, Statutes and the Sources ofLaw, in R. Pound (ed), HarvardLegal Essays
213 (1934); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy 19 (1956); Stone, The Common Law
in the UnitedStates, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1900); Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles,
[19441 Wisc. L. Rev. 175; Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case,
31 111. L. Rev. 202 (1936).
27 Traynor, Statutes Revolving In Common Law Orbits, 17 Catholic U.L. Rev-401,
405 (1%8).
28 Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 Yale L.J. 258 (1972); 3 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory
Construction:A Revision ofSutherlandStatutory Constructionpara. 53.01-53.02:
R. Schlesinger, ComparativeLaw: Cases - Text - Materials 398 (30 ed. 1970).
29 W. Dale, Legislative Drafting: A New Approach (1977); In the Preface to their
"Draft Evidence Code" the Scottish Law Commission gave the following explanation for drafting in terms of principles. It is worth quoting at length:
It is clear that the form of a code must differ radically from that of an existing British statute. The present form of such statutes is conditioned by the
fact that they are drafted against the background of the body of existing law,
details of which it is desired to change. A code, on the other hand, is designed to set out the whole law relating to a particular subject in a comprehensive and systematic way, and to form the basic source of legal principle in
that field. It is neither designed simply to effect alterations to existing law,
though it may do so incidentally, nor simply to restate the law, though in
fact it may do this; it is designed rather to supplant the existing law completely in a particular field. In this situation the particularised drafting
which is thought appropriate to existing legislation would be out of place. It
is not desirable to put the Courts in a straitjacket from which they will
inevitably seek to escape; the history of foreign codifications suggests that
attemps to envisage all possible situations are conspicuous only by their failure.
A code, therefore, should be drafted with the primary aim of enunciating
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and large, is drafted in general terms. 3 Is this style of drafting incompatible with the common law tradition? The vociferous
criticisms made against the Code on the grounds that it was drafted
in the civilian style, or that it gives too much discretion to the judge
because it is drafted in terms of general principles, is an indication
that at least some people feel it is incompatible. A review of the costs
and benefits of drafting in terms of general principles or in terms of
detailed rules, however, reveals that the question of what style of
drafting to choose is pragmatic and that the same issues and considerations confront a draftsperson in both common and civil law
systems.
Before discussing the considerations that led the draftpersons
of the Evidence Code to draft, in the main, in terms of general
principles, let me define my terms. The distinction between detailed
and specifically drafted rules and rules drafted in terms of general
principles is similar to the distinction made by some authors
between rules and principles, rules and discretion, and formal and
nonformal decision-making. .' Since, however, I do not wish to enter
the more general debate raised by these authors, I will stipulate
definitions. 12

To apply a rule, or a detailed legislative provision, the judge
needs to look only at a limited range of information. The facts he
must find in order to decide if the rule applies are specific, usually
obvious, discrete, and easily determined. An example of a rule would

29 (Continued)
clearly and simply the basic principles of the relevant branch of the law in a
form in which they can be readily understood by legal practitioners and
others who may wish to consult it. The application of these principles to
particular problems, which is often a matter of concern in existing statutes,
should be left as a rule to the Courts to determine. It is for the Courts to give
effect to those principles against the background of a pattern of life which
constantly alters. It is recognised that with the passage of time the interpretation of particular articles may change; this is a result to be sought rather
than to be deplored.
Scottish Law Commission, Draft Evidence Code 3-4 (1973).
30 "A codifying Act on the law of evidence, drafted in the continental fashion, has
been produced by the Canadian Law Reform Commission." Dale, Legislative
Drafting: A New Approach 339 (1977).
31 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Greenawalt, Discretion and
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest tbr the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 Colum.
L. Rev. 359 (1975). Sartorius, Social Policy and JudicialLegislation, 8 Am. Phil.
Q. 151 (1971). Raz, LegalPrinciples andtheLimits ofLaw, 81 Yale L.J. 823 (1972).
32 For a similar analysis see Ehrlich and Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 Journal of Legal Studies 257 (1974); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
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be a section which reads: "All prior consistent, out-of-court statements made by a witness are inadmissible." Normally, the judge will
be able to determine whether the rule applies with a high degree of
certainty and without considering the policies that led to its enactment. However, even with such an apparently straightforward rule
an understanding of its purpose will be necessary, in some cases, to
determine its application; for example, in deciding whether
"conduct" in this context can amount to a statement.
By contrast, the application of a principle requires the judge to
consider the entirety of a factual situation and to assess whether it
should apply by reference to its purpose. In applying a principle, the
judge will have to engage in weighing the competing interests as well
as making a factual judgment. For example, instead of having a rule
such as the one stated above, excluding prior out-of-court statements, the Evidence Code contains a section requiring the judge to
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger
that its proof and disproof would consume an undue amount of
time. This is, of course, the purpose of the rule which excludes prior
statements. It is designed to expedite trials.
Throughout the rules of evidence, or any area of law for that
matter, the decision of whether to draft in terms of rules or principles has to be made. What I would like to do then is review some of
the considerations that must be taken into account in deciding
whether to draft rules with specificity or to draft rules of higher
generality. To return to the point of my argument, these factors
would be important whether one were drafting in a civil or a
common law jurisdiction. And there is no reason why a consideration of these factors should inevitably lead to the conclusion that
drafting should always be done in terms of detailed rules in a
common law jurisdiction.
Benefits of Drafting in Terms of Rules
One of the most frequently claimed virtues of rules is that their
application is certain. This general proposition subsumes a whole
series of arguments offered in favour of detailed rules: they facilitate
private planning, thereby reducing litigation; they act as a curb on
the arbitrary powers of the judge; they ensure equality before the
law; and, they result in more democratic law-making because it is
the elected representatives who assume the responsibility for making
the necessary value choices. All these arguments depend for their
validity upon the proposition that the application of rules is
predictable.
There would appear, on its face, to be little more room for disputing the proposition that a rule is more likely than a principle to
lead to predictable results. By definition the number of factors that a
decision-maker must take into account in applying a rule are fewer
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than those to be considered in applying a standard. Furthermore,
the application of a rule does not involve the weighing of competing
interests. It is important, however, to go beyond such a facile assertion. A number of observations about the predictability of the application of rules as compared to the predictability of the application of
principles may be made.
In many instances, what appear to be rules are simply principles masquerading as rules. Thus, the claimed advantages of predictability are illusory. A number of concepts in evidence law illustrate
this phenomenon; for example, the concept of competency. Lawyers
often advert to the rule that young children are incompetent to give
testimony. The Evidence Code does not contain a rule dealing
explicitly with the competency of witnesses. Rather, a section
provides that the judge can exclude evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger either that it will mislead the jury or consume an undue amount of time. Critics have alleged that this is but
another instance in which a perfectly workable and certain rule has
been replaced by a discretionary principle. Such an allegation
assumes that the rules of competency are self-executing, or that they
give the judge greater guidance in specific instances than the principle that "where, because of a witness' perceptual capabilities or
moral development, his or her testimony is of slight probative value
and might mislead the jury or consume an inordinate amount of
time, it should be excluded." The Evidence Code does not change
the present law. It simply makes explicit the judgment that must be
made in holding a witness incompetent to give testimony.
Another example of a concept which involves the application of
a principle and not a rule is the concept of legal relevancy. In the
Code, relevancy is defined as logical relevancy and then a provision
is added which permits the judge to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by, for instance, the undue consumption of time. This is another example, so it is often alleged, of where
the drafters have replaced a rule (that evidence must be legally relevant to be admissible) with a principle or discretion (that requires
the judge to weigh the probative value of offered evidence against the
dangers of prejudice, the needless consumption of time and so on).
But, what is "legal relevance"? By what process of reasoning does a
judge reach the conclusion that evidence is legally relevant? He
cannot apply a standard of logical relevance alone. Even in a simple
trial a logician could point to logically relevant evidence that would
consume months to hear. Therefore, where the judge rules evidence
legally irrelevant, he is invariably engaged in a balancing process. He
is balancing the probative value of the evidence against the amount
of time that it would consume to hear evidence against the amount
of time that it would consume to hear evidence tending to prove and
disprove the fact. Again, the Code does not increase the amount of
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discretion a judge has in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, it
simply recognizes that this evidentiary concept, the concept of legal
relevancy, embraces the application of a principle.
Many evidentiary concepts are similar to the two just mentioned.
Their label tends to obscure the judgmental element involved in
applying them. All that the Code does is make the principle or discretion explicit. The drafters attempted to compel judges to address
themselves expressly to the relevant considerations in applying
evidentiary concepts so that a weighing of the competing interests
becomes, not only an explanation for the judge's decision, but also
part of the justification for his or her decisions.
Rules often do not lead to certainty because they provide judges
with the opportunity of engaging in conceptual reasoning. The
collateral fact rule is an example. In the early nineteenth century,
judges used the term collateral fact to describe a legal consequence.
Evidence was excluded because it bore so indirectly on the issues in
the case that its probative value was outweighed by the danger that
the admission of evidence tending to prove or disprove it would
consume an inordinate amount of time. Subsequently judges began
phrasing this principle as a rule - evidence of collateral facts is
inadmissible. They began to use the term collateral itself as a
premise for legal reasoning. This lead to great uncertainty in the
jurisprudence because if no reference is made to the reason for using
it, the term "collateral" can assume many shades of meaning. The
meaning of evidentiary concepts such as res gestae, burden of proof
and similar fact evidence, are similarly indeterminate because of the
effort the judges make to attach meaning to them by reference to
their ordinary usage or the facts of previous cases. 31
Even if rules have a specific reference, their rigidity and the fact
that they can never perfectly implement the reasons for their existence also tends to introduce in trials an aforeseen lack of predictability. It has been observed countless times that courts, torn
between the duties of staying within the law or reaching a just result,
frequently accommodate the latter by manipulating the former. It
was to this well-established process that Holmes directed his
epigrammatic remark, "hard cases make bad law". Decisions
arrived at through the technique of manipulation and adverse construction may result in justice for the immediate parties. However,
they lead to great uncertainty in the application of the law and leave
in their wake a twisted law to haunt lawyers and confuse judges in
subsequent cases not involving the same "fireside equities". This is
seen again and again in the laws of evidence. Indeed, the whole of
the case law dealing with the rules relating to corroboration can be
33
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rationally explained only on this basis. Apellate court judges, who
are of the view that in a particular case there is insufficient evidence
to convict the accused, frequently resort to some aspect of the law of
corroboration to achieve their desired result, a new trial. They might
hold that the trial judge did not properly explain the rules relating to
corroboration to the jury, the evidence the trial judge found to be
corroborative could not in law be corroborative, or that the judge
made some other error relating to the countless distinctions and
refinements that have been engrafted into this body of law. The
obscure flexibility that this introduces into the law is, of course,
much more pernicious than that introduced by principles. Stating the
rules in terms of principles directs the courts to consider and rule
directly on the dangers that might arise in specific situations. It
permits the courts a safety valve to prevent distortions and the
consequent pernicious uncertainty of rules.
The uncertainty inherent in the application of principles is
often greatly exaggerated. Principles such as good faith, due care,
fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness
abound throughout the law, and uncertainty has not resulted.
Empirical evidence about the predictibility of the application of
principles is available by reviewing the experience with the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States. Karl Llewlyn, who was primarily responsible for drafting Article 2 of the Code, employed many
broad standards. This drafting sytle was implicitly based on the
claim that ideas, like "reasonableness" and "good faith", provide
greater predictability in practice than an intricate and technical rule
system. 34 The Article has not given 35rise to excessive litigation and
has survived with few amendments.
While some of the principles used in the Code may appear
vague in the abstract, their application will usually not be in doubt
in specific factual situations. Furthermore, as jurisprudence
develops in the "doubtful" cases, the principles will be given even
more specific content, by what John Dickinson has aptly referred to
as "the downward elaboration of principles." 3
A final thought on this question of the predictability of rules.
Even conceding that the application of rules is more predictable
than principles, evidence is an area of law where certainty is not the
all important requirement it is often assumed to be. Rules of
evidence are generally not designed to act as standards of conduct,
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as rules that people deliberately intend to invoke in ordering their
affairs (except to the extent that a person relies on them in fashioning a transaction so that it can be easily proved at trial, and under
any system it would generally be easy to plan to ensure admissibility); nor are rules of evidence designed to encourage or discourage
certain kinds of social or economic activity (except in the area of
privilege: if the purpose of a privilege is to foster candor, people
must have confidence that at trial the rule will operate to render
their confidential statements inadmissible). Certainty is, of course,
important in those areas of law that are designed to facilitate private
ordering to deter people from or encourage them to engage in
certain activities. In the main, the purposes of the rules of evidence
are: to further certain procedural interests, such as expedition,
finality, and administrative convenience; and to ensure, to the extent
possible, and within the parameters of the judicial trial, that
disputes are resolved on their merits.
Predictability becomes more important when a dispute arises
and the parties have to predict the outcome of possible litigation. If
the evidentiary rules offer predictability at this stage, outcome of the
case will be easier to predict, thus increasing the likelihood of settlement and reducing the total cost of dispute resolution. Further, if a
case which is doubtful on its merits goes to trial, predictability in the
application of evidence rules will reduce the costs of trial by reducing
the number and length of voir dires and the number of appeals on
evidentiary matters. Yet, the importance of predictability, even at
these stages of the process, can be exaggerated. Seldom will the possible admission of one or two items of evidence be a determinative
factor in deciding whether to go to trial. And the costs of preparing
an offer of proof that is later ruled inadmissible are not nearly as
great as the costs involved when a case is not decided on its merits.
Costs of Drafting in Terms of Rules
Even assuming that rules are more certain in application than
principles and that there is a need for certainty in evidence law, this
benefit must be weighed against the costs of enacting rules as
opposed to principles.
The most obvious and, in many cases, the most severe cost of
rules is that a rule will never perfectly implement the policies underlying its formulation; it will, in some cases, be over inclusive, and, in
others, under inclusive. This is necessarily so because by definition a
rule excludes relevant information from the decision-making
process.
The rules relating to spousal competency can be used to illustrate this cost. A policy decision might be made that certain relationships in society deserve protection to the extent that one party to
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such a relationship should not be compelled to testify against the
other because that will endanger the relationship. How should this
policy be implemented? Since the family relationship is perhaps the
most important such relationship, a rule could be enacted that one
spouse cannot be compelled to testify against the other. An obvious
problem with this means of implementing the policy is that, in some
cases, such a rule does not implement the policy, and in other cases,
it extends far beyond the policy. For instance, what about a common
law relationship? Clearly, the rationale would cover the relationship
but the rule would not. What about a married couple who have been
separated for a number of years or whose relationship has completely broken down? The rationale would not extend to them but the
rule would.
The extent of this cost depends upon how nearly the rule implements the policy and how serious, in terms of social costs, is the
failure to cover all the situations to which the policy of the rule would
extend. In most areas of law, guidelines can probably be formulated
to assist in resolving this question. In Evidence law, for example, the
under- or over-inclusiveness of a rule to implement the policy that
evidence of slight probative value should be excluded if its proof and
disproof will result in an undue delay of the trial (such as a rule
excluding collateral facts or prior consistent statements,) is less
serious than the under-inclusiveness of a rule designed to exclude
evidence that might tend to prejudice the trier of fact against the
accused in a criminal case. The former policy is concerned with
economic costs, the latter with protecting innocent persons. This
consideration undoubtedly accounts for the fact that judges are
more willing to recognize that they have a residual discretion to
exclude prejudicial evidence than they are willing to recognize that
they have a discretion to exclude merely time-consuming or
confusing evidence.
This cost of rules, the fact that they are both over- and underinclusive, is particularly serious with many of the present rules of
evidence and it is related to another attack made on conceptualism
by the American Realists. The Realists noted that concepts almost
invariably emerge which abstract reality at too high or too general a
level in order to ensure that the rule being developed is not underinclusive. Thus they attacked concepts such as "master and
servant", "property", and "consideration" because they lumped
together socially disparate situations that needed differential treatment. Such criticism can easily be made of many rules of evidence.
The hearsay rule, for example, classifies together all assertions made
outside of a particular courtroom in a particular case and treats
them alike. It is a concept that abstracts reality at such a general
level that the differences it ignores are vastly more important than
the single similarity upon which it is based. As Professor Lowinger
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has noted, "It is almost self-evident that there can be little utility in a
class which is so broad as to include the prattling of a child and the
mouthings of a drunk, the encyclical of a pope, a learned treatise, an
encyclopedia article, a newspaper report, an unverified rumor from
anonymous sources, an affidavit by a responsible citizen, a street
corner remark, the judgment of a court, and innumerable other
equally disparate sources of information." 37
To reduce the coverage of rules - to finely-tune their application
- exceptions might be created to carve out situations in which the
rule is obviously over-inclusive. The courts, for example, have
created a series of exceptions to the hearsay rule. Indeed no two
authors can agree on the number. However, as well as introducing
into the law an immense degree of complexity, this method of
attempting to make rules "just" often leads to arbitrariness. For
example, the present rule that spouses cannot be compelled to testify
against one another is subject to over thirty exceptions. The application of these exceptions can lead to the following anomalous
results: if a man is charged with the rape of a woman, his wife can be
compelled to testify against him; if he is charged with the murder of
the same woman, she cannot; if a man is charged with attempting to
commit buggery his wife can be forced to testify against him; if he
commits it, she cannot; if a man murders his wife's mother, sister or
child, his wife cannot testify against him even if she wishes. The rule
is often justified on the grounds that society has an interest in
preserving the marriage relationship because of the harm caused the
children by a marriage breakdown, and yet children can be compelled to testify against parents and vice versa. Thus, this cost of rules,
that they often must abstract reality at a high level of generality so as
not to be under-inclusive and are therefore often over-inclusive, cannot be cured in most cases without introducing enormous complexity
and a degree of arbitrariness into the law.
A second cost of rules is that they tend to freeze the law. The
values or conditions of one period of time become encased in a rule
that is not changed to account for changing values or conditions.
The application of principles more readily admits a solution to this
problem. For example, the common law rules relating to best evidence could not be applied to computer printouts, but the principle
clearly covered them. The statutory rules creating a marital privilege
could not be extended to cover an increasing number of common law
relationships or extended families. By contrast, a common law
principle relating to the waiver of formal proof for notorious facts
embraces new scientific developments as they emerge.
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Another cost of rules, in this area at least, is that they render the
law incomprehensible to lay people. Rules, as mentioned, are
arbitrary and their purpose is often obscure. Principles on the other
hand explicitly reflect their purpose and will often be comprehensible to the non-lawyer as a result. Furthermore the principles
underlying the hundreds of detailed rules of evidence are few in
number. Compare the thirty pages of the Evidence Code to Wigmore's ten volumes on common law evidence. The analysis involved
in deciding whether to draft a rule or a principle can only be made
after a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of using one
approach as opposed to the other. In drafting the Evidence Code the
drafters were often of the view that the benefits of drafting a principle in a particular section, outweighed the costs. While this method
of drafting might have been inspired by the civilian system, the
arguments in favour of drafting in such a style do not derive from
any premises "foreign" to the common law. Furthermore, in determining the generality of the drafting in a civilian jurisdiction the
same kind of analysis must presumably also be undertaken.

Conclusion
The characteristics of the Evidence Code that are most
frequently alluded to in asserting its compatibility with the common
law - its comprehensiveness, the fact that it is pre-emptive of the
preceding decisional law, and the generality of its drafting - were
ascribed to the Code only after a careful analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of such attributes. They cannot be discredited
simply by referring to them as foreign to the common law. The common law lawyer and the civilian lawyer may have different instincts,
acquired through the socialization processes inherent in their
respective systems, as to what a legislative enactment should look
like. However, in the process of rational law reform the value of these
instincts falls away. The law reformer must engage in a dispassionate weighing of costs and benefits. If the end product looks more
civilian than common law (or vice versa), so be it. The advantage we
have in Canada is that the process of reform can draw on the experience of both systems of law. This advantage will hopefully not be lost
because of narrow-minded provincialism.

